competition success review subscribe Published this articles page no 108 Object auction largely abstracted from these problems. Another three multiple round auctions are also relevant so far as demand for radio frequencies is concerned. They are SMRA also mentioned as Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCA) and Incentive Auctions. The two proposals on which SMRA was based are by Milgrom and Wilson and by Preston McAfee. On a successful note the FCC spectrum of 1994 increased the auction to twice the expected amount (i.e. $20 billion) and about $34 billion raised by the U.K. 3G spectrum auction in 2000. The SMRA auction design for spectrum sales has been widely applied worldwide. Some versions of this are applied in U.S. Canada U.K. Finland India Poland Germany Sweden Norway and Spain. After adopting of CCA for selling radio-spectrum licenses in the U.K. in 2008 many countries followed suit including Austria Australia Canada Denmark Ireland the Netherlands Romania Slovakia and Switzerland. Milgrom led the team of economists who advised going for wireless broadband services than from broadcast television resulted in the FCC adopting the new Incentive auction in 2017. The auctions reflect two efficiency concerns. Firstly the best productive suppliers minimize the costs. Secondly this generates funds through markets than rigid taxation. Economists observed that the per unit taxes (in dollar) raise the social deadweight losses is between 0.17 to 0.56 dollars. Conversely the objective of maximal revenue of a set of spectrum licenses may be too short-sighted and lead to monopolization. However both approaches have been rejected by economists so far as net public welfare is concerned. competition success review subscribe
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